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Digest:  Committee for Green Foothills v. 
Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors 
Stephanie Brou 
Opinion by Corrigan, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, 
Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. 
Issue 
Does the filing of notice of determination (NOD) without 
environmental review trigger a 30-day statute of limitations 
under the California Environmental Quality Act? 
Facts 
In 2000, the Leland Stanford Junior University acquired a 
permit to add buildings to its campus.1  Prior to the approval of 
the permit, an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared for 
the project identified possible environmental impacts and 
proposed mitigation measures.2  Because the EIR found that the 
development would substantially impact public access to 
recreation facilities, a mitigation measure directed Stanford to 
coordinate with the County parks department and to dedicate 
trail easements.3  The agreement included trails labeled S1 and 
C1.4  While the trails were approved in the “Trails Master Plan,”5 
and a supplemental EIR was published regarding the S1 trails, a 
dispute delayed the C1 trails.6  After continued negotiations the 
County authorized the “Trails Agreement” in 2005, which 
illustrated the construction, maintenance, and details of the S1 
and C1 easements.7  The County Board of Supervisors 
determined that the Trails Agreement did not require further 
environmental review regarding the C1 trails because it did not 
constitute a new project subject to independent California 
 
 1 Comm. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 4th 32, 
39 (2010). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 39 n.2. 
 6 Id. at 40. 
 7 Id. 
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Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, but rather was 
subsequent activity within the scope of the Trails Master Plan.8 
On December 20, 2005, the County filed a revised NOD with 
the county clerk reporting that the County approved an 
agreement for the C1 and C2 trails.9  The NOD also stated that 
an EIR had been prepared and that findings had been made 
pursuant to CEQA.10  On June 9, 2006 (171 days after the revised 
NOD was filed), the Committee for Green Foothills (Committee) 
challenged the County’s approval of the Trails Agreement.11  The 
trial court sustained the County’s demurrer on the grounds that 
the NOD triggered a 30-day statute of limitations, and thus the 
Committee’s challenge was time-barred.12  The Court of Appeal 
reversed, concluding there was “a reasonable possibility” that a 
longer 180-day statute of limitations applied.13 
Analysis 
California Environmental Quality Act section 21152(a) 
requires a local agency that approves or embarks on a project 
that is subject to CEQA to file an NOD with the county clerk.14  
Also, if an agency approves a project it believes is exempt from 
CEQA, it must file a notice of exemption with the county clerk.15  
These filings are intended to preserve the public’s right to be 
informed and aware of environmental decisions.16  Section 21167 
establishes an unusually short 30-day statute of limitations for 
CEQA challenges to be brought, running from the date of NOD or 
notice of exemption.17  If no NOD or notice of exemption was 
filed, the statute of limitations is increased to 180 days from the 
approval of the project; if a project is begun without a decision 
regarding the environmental impacts, the statute of limitations 
is 180 days from commencement of the project.18  The Committee 
contended that the Trails Agreement constituted a project 
separate from the Trails Master Plan, and that the County 
approved the Trails Agreement without consideration of the 
 
 8 Id. at 41. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 41–42. 
 12 Id. at 42. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 42–43 (citing California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§ 21152(a) (2010)). 
 15 Id. at 43 (citing California Environmental Quality Act § 21152(b)). 
 16 Id. at 43. 
 17 Id. at 44 n.8 (citing California Environmental Quality Act § 21167). 
 18 Id. at 44 n.8. 
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environmental effects, thus the 180-day statute of limitations 
applied.19 
The court found that the statutory language of section 21167 
“strongly suggests that the Legislature intended the filing of an 
NOD to trigger a 30-day statute of limitations.”20  The plain 
language of section 21167 requires a 30-day statute of limitations 
for all claims related to a project when a notice is filed.21  Only 
when notice is not given does the 180-day statute of limitations 
apply.22  Logically, when an agency alerts the public about a 
decision, the public can be expected to act quickly in challenging 
that decision.23  However, when an agency does not give notice, 
the public is not alerted until constructive notice is given by the 
start of the project, thus necessitating an extended statute of 
limitations.24  Statutory language does not support the 
Committee’s claim that the 180-day statute of limitations should 
apply despite the filing of an NOD.25 
The Regulatory Guidelines implementing CEQA further 
support the contention that a 30-day statute of limitations 
applies.26  The Guidelines offer additional rules and statutes of 
limitations for CEQA challenges.27  Each limitation is either 30 
or 35 days when notice is given.28  Similar to section 21167, a 
180-day statute of limitations applies only when there is not 
public notice.29 
The court found further support for a shorter statute of 
limitations in two similar bill reports concerning the Department 
of Water Resources and the Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research.30  Both bill reports require claims to be filed within 30 
days of notice.31  The court relied on the fact that the Guidelines 
and the two similar bills have identical statutes of limitations in 
its conclusion that the Legislature clearly intended to impose 
strict limits on the timeframe of challenging a project.32  The 
Committee provided no evidence to suggest that the Legislature 
 
 19 Id. at 45. 
 20 Id. at 46. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 47. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 47–48. 
 26 Id. at 48–49. 
 27 Id. at 48. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 49–50. 
 31 Id. at 49. 
 32 Id. at 49–50 n.15. 
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intended to increase the statute of limitations six-fold, despite 
notice being provided.33 
Legislative intent for a short statute of limitations is 
consistent with policy considerations for prompt filing of 
challenges.34  CEQA challenges impose financial prejudice and 
disruption to development and must not be permitted to delay 
projects.35  Additionally, a clear and short statute of limitations 
provides certainty.36  Public policy does not support delay or 
uncertainty that encourages builders to wait 180 days before 
commencing on approved projects to avoid litigation.37  In fact, 
unnecessary delay is precisely what the Legislature intended to 
avoid by imposing a short statute of limitations.38 
The Committee argued that the longer statute of limitations 
should apply because the County did not conduct an 
environmental review before approving the agreement.39  The 
court rejected this argument, citing California Manufacturers 
Ass’n. v. Industrial Welfare Commission.40  Like the Committee 
in the instant case, in California Manufacturers, an association 
argued that the 30-day statute of limitations applies only if the 
agency has conducted an environmental investigation.41  There, 
the Court of Appeal determined that the trigger of the 30-day 
statute of limitations was the notice, not the substance of the 
agency’s decision.42  Here, the court agreed and further stated 
that, where an NOD has been filed, the agency has attempted 
compliance with CEQA.43  Accordingly, the Legislature intended 
for the 30-day statute of limitations to apply regardless of 
environmental review.44 
Next, the Committee argued that the NOD was invalid and 
therefore did not trigger the 30-day statute of limitations.45  The 
court noted that several cases have made exceptions to the strict 
statute of limitations when notice was materially defective.46  In 
 
 33 Id. at 50. 
 34 Id. (citing Oceanside Marina Towers Ass’n. v. Oceanside Cmty. Dev. Comm’n, 187 
Cal. App. 3d 735, 741 (1986)). 
 35 Id. (citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 830, 837 (1994)). 
 36 Id. at 50. 
 37 Id. at 50–51. 
 38 Id. at 51. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. (citing Cal. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, 109 Cal. App. 3d 95, 124–25 
(1980)). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. (citing Cal. Mfrs., 109 Cal. App. 3d at 125). 
 43 Id. at 51. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 52. 
 46 Id. 
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ILWU v. Board of Directors, the court did not enforce a 35-day 
statute of limitations because the notice was not in substantial 
compliance of the notice requirements.47  Similarly, in Citizens of 
Lake Murray Area Ass’n. v. City Council, the court refused to 
hold plaintiffs to a 30-day statute of limitations because the 
county clerk failed to post the notice pursuant to the statute.48  
While the Committee relied on the foregoing cases, the court 
distinguished them from the instant case, finding instead that 
the County’s notice contained every provision required by the 
CEQA guidelines and thus was not materially defective.49 
The Committee contended that the NOD for the Trails 
Agreement should be separate and distinct from the NOD for the 
Trails Master Plan.50  Additionally, the Committee alleged that 
the County issued the NOD to include the C1 and C2 trails with 
a bad faith intention to conceal these additional trails.51  While 
the court agreed that the County could have issued two separate 
NODs, they declined to impose that additional requirement when 
nothing in CEQA precludes disclosure of two approvals in a 
single notice.52  Additionally, there was no evidence that the 
County acted with bad intention.53  In fact, the Board’s resolution 
was passed at a meeting where the Committee’s representative 
was present.54  The Legislature intended for NODs to trigger the 
30-day statute of limitations.55  Thus, it was the responsibility of 
the Committee to review these notices carefully.56 
The Committee’s final argument was that the revised NOD 
was invalid because the County failed to make an environmental 
determination and prepare a corresponding negative declaration 
or EIR.57  The court found this claim unpersuasive, instead 
determining that no new CEQA document was required.58  CEQA 
does not require a new EIR for every subsequent step in the same 
project.59  After a proper EIR is prepared, a supplemental EIR is 
only required if substantial changes arise or new information 
 
 47 Id. at 52–53. (citing ILWU v Bd. of Dirs., 116 Cal. App. 3d 265, 273 (1981)). 
 48 Id. at 53 (citing Citizens of Lake Murray Area Ass’n. v. City Council, 129 Cal. App. 
3d 436, 438 (1982)). 
 49 Id. at 53. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 53–54. 
 52 Id. at 54. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. (citing California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21108, 
21152 (2010)). 
 59 Id. at 54. 
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becomes known that was not available at the time of the original 
EIR.60  The Committee was correct in asserting that if 
subsequent activity could have environmental effects not 
considered in the existing EIR, the agency must conduct an 
initial study resulting in either a negative declaration or an 
EIR.61  However, if the agency finds that no new environmental 
effects could occur, the subsequent activity can be considered 
within the scope of the project covered by the existing EIR and no 
new determination is required.62 
The Trails Agreement qualified as a subsequent activity 
subject to potential further environmental review, and thus the 
County was required to evaluate the potential environmental 
impact—which it did.63  The County issued a resolution finding 
the Trails Agreement required no addition CEQA review prior to 
commencing the Trails Agreement.64  The court deemed it 
unnecessary to examine whether the County’s determination was 
proper.65  The fact that the County evaluated the Trails 
Agreement as subsequent activity to a program EIR and that it 
had found the Trails Agreement to be within the scope of the EIR 
was sufficient.66  An NOD triggers the 30-day statute of 
limitations even if environmental review is inadequate.67 
Holding 
The court reversed the Court of Appeal.68  The court held the 
County’s filing of the NOD triggered the 30-day statute of 
limitations.69  Because the Committee filed its petition more than 
30 days after the NOD, the suit was time-barred.70 
Legal Significance 
The court’s decision strictly applies a shorter statute of 
limitations when notice is given.  Because lack of environmental 
review and potential errors in the notice do not necessarily 
extend the statute of limitations, potential litigators challenging 
CEQA must carefully review NODs and file a petition within the 
30-day statute of limitations. 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 55. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 55–56. 
 67 Id. at 56–57. 
 68 Id. at 57. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
